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I. Introduction
A primary aspect of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) mission is to monitor health.1
One of the ways in which the CDC performs this task is by setting up surveillance systems that monitor
a wide range of health issues, from the incidence of illness to adverse reactions to vaccines. In this paper,
various surveillance systems that the CDC has established to monitor the eﬀects of FDA-regulated products
will be discussed. Most of this surveillance of FDA-regulated products is indirect. The CDC typically
studies illnesses or reactions resulting from use of the FDA-regulated product, it studies the eﬀects of the
product, not the product itself. These eﬀects vary from cases of foodborne illness to increased antimicrobial
resistance. The primary focus of this paper on the CDC surveillance eﬀorts in this area is on the surveillance
1Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, About CDC, at http://www.cdc.gov/aboutcdc.htm (last visited March 7,
2003).
1of foodborne illness. These surveillance systems are not perfect, and various problems and deﬁciencies with
the systems will also be discussed.
II. Surveillance of Foodborne Illnesses
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated in 1999 that foodborne illnesses cause
5,000 deaths in the United States each year.2 The danger posed by the pathogens that cause foodborne
illnesses is increasing. New pathogens are constantly being discovered, and those we already know about
are growing increasingly resistant to treatment.3 Although the American food supply is one of the safest in
the world, these pathogens create a worrisome threat, particularly as Americans’ eating habits lead them
more and more to processed foods and sizable portions of the population increase in age, which increases the
susceptibility of Americans to these pathogens.4 Over time, it appears that the CDC’s surveillance systems
might have helped reduce the amount of foodborne illness in the United States. In 2002, Health and Human
Services Secretary Tommy Thompson announced that, according to CDC, there was “a 23 percent overall
drop in bacterial food borne illnesses since 1996.”5 The 1996 start date was presumably used for comparison
because FoodNet was started in 1996.6 Despite this drop, the CDC’s surveillance systems need further
development. Of the 76 million cases of foodborne illness that the CDC estimates occur in the United States
2Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Oﬃce of Communication, CDC Data Provides The Most Complete Estimate
On Foodborne Disease in the United States, September, 16, 1999 at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/r990917.htm
(last visited March 7, 2003).
3Id.; Robert V.Tauxe, Emerging Foodborne Diseases: An Evolving Public Health Challenge, 3 Emerging Infectious Dis-
eases 425, 426 (October-December 1997), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol3no4/adobe/tauxe.pdf (last visited
March 7, 2003).
4Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Oﬃce of Communication, CDC Data Provides The Most Complete Estimate
On Foodborne Disease in the United States , supra note 2.
5Melinda Hemmelgarm, New Data Show Decline In National Food Borne Illness, Human Environmental Sciences Extension’s
Resource: University of Missouri-Columbia, at http://outreach.missouri.edu/hesnutrnews/safe4-19-02.htm (last visited March
7, 2003).
6Id.
2each year, only 13.8 million of those cases have been linked to known pathogens.7 These numbers clearly
indicate major gaps within the CDC’s surveillance systems and the room for improvement in identifying and
conducting surveillance of foodborne illnesses.8
The CDC falls under the authority of the United States Department of Health and Human Services.9 Most
of the CDC’s foodborne illness surveillance eﬀorts fall under the auspices of the Foodborne and Diarrheal
Diseases Branch of the CDC.10 This branch not only oversees the eﬀorts of surveillance systems like FoodNet
and PulseNet, but also assists in the investigation of outbreaks of illness, conducts research and consults
with state and local public health departments.11
Over the last several years, the role of the CDC in surveillance of foodborne illness in the United States has
increased. One incident which demonstrated the increased need for CDC surveillance were outbreaks of the
parasitic pathogen Cyclospora cayetanensis in 1996 and 1997 resulting from the importation of raspberries
from Guatemala.12 The importation of the raspberries was suspended and surveillance also helped to detect
the pathogen in mesclun lettuce and basil.13
The increase in surveillance stemmed in large part from the Clinton Administration’s National Food Safety
Initiative, which was introduced in 1997.14 Two of the primary surveillance organizations that the CDC helps
operate are FoodNet and PulseNet, both of which predate the National Food Safety Initiative. FoodNet, is
a network made up of the CDC, sites in nine states of the CDC’s Emerging Infections Program, the U.S.
7Martin Wiedmann, Methods In Nutrition Science – Subtyping Of Bacterial Foodborne Pathogens, Nutrition Reviews,
July 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 11792192.
8Id.
9Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, About CDC, supra note 1.
10Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, Foodborne and Diarrheal Diseases
Branch, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/foodborne/index.htm (last visited March 7, 2003).
11Id.
12Robert V. Tauxe, New Approaches to Surveillance and Control of Emerging Foodborne Infectious Diseases, 4 Emerging
Infectious Diseases 455 (July-September 1998), available at ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/EID/vol4no3/adobe/tauxe.pdf (last visited
March 7, 2003).
13Id. at 455.
14Corrections, President’s National Food Safety Initiative, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,922, 45,922 (August 27, 1998); Tauxe, New
Approaches to Surveillance and Control of Emerging Foodborne Infectious Diseases, supra note 12, at 455.
3Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).15 Another network,
PulseNet, is also made up of the CDC and a system of state public health laboratories in all ﬁfty states,
ﬁve local public health laboratories, the USDA FSIS laboratory and seven FDA laboratories.16 PulseNet
handles molecular subtyping, whereas FoodNet concentrates on antimicrobial resistance.17 CDC’s role in
analyzing data from the surveillance networks is “to (1) monitor national health trends, (2) formulate and
implement prevention strategies, (3) evaluate state and federal disease prevention eﬀorts, and (4) identify
outbreaks that aﬀect multiple jurisdictions....”18
A crucial aspect to consider when looking at the CDC’s role in surveillance and in food safety overall is
that the “CDC is not a regulatory agency.”19 The CDC lacks the ability to make regulations that would
bring about improvements in reducing the amount of foodborne illness, and is reliant on agencies such as the
FDA and the USDA to enact speciﬁc policies.20 However, the information and advice that the CDC shares
with these agencies and others may have an impact upon the policies and regulations that those agencies
develop.21 For instance, it is through the use of surveillance that the FDA may see the impact that its
regulations have. If the FDA institutes a number of regulations meant to curb the spread of Camplyobacter,
and in resulting studies the CDC shows that its surveillance data indicates a reduction in infections resulting
from Camplyobacter, then the FDA can perhaps try to establish if there is a causal relationship between
that data and its regulations.22 At the same time, surveillance data may also seem to suggest that certain
15Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, FoodNet, What is FoodNet? at http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/what is.htm
(last visited March 7, 2003).
16Centers of Disease Control and Prevention, PulseNet: The National Molecular Subtyping Network for Foodborne Disease
Surveillance, at http://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/ (last visited March 7, 2003).
17Tauxe, New Approaches to Surveillance and Control of Emerging Foodborne Infectious Diseases, supra note 12, at 455.
18U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, U.S. Senate:
Food Safety: CDC Is Working to Address Limitations in Several of Its Foodborne Disease Surveillance Systems, GAO-01-973
Food Safety Surveillance (Sept. 2001), at 6, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01973.pdf.
19Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Foodborne Infections, What is CDC Doing to Control and Prevent Foodborne
Disease?, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/foodborneinfections g.htm (last visited March 7, 2003).
20Id.
21Id.
22Id.
4regulations have been ineﬀective, when the data shows no decline, or perhaps even an increase in infections.23
A. FoodNet
The Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network, (FoodNet) is the primary network that the CDC uses
in conducting surveillance of foodborne illnesses, many of which result from consumption of FDA-regulated
products. FoodNet is part of the CDC’s Emerging Infections Program (EIP).24As noted above, the CDC is
not the sole agency involved in FoodNet: the FDA, USDA and sites in 9 states also participate.25 In fact,
this participation is essential to the operation of the network. FoodNet predates the National Food Safety
Initiative, having started in 1995, and it has expanded in size since then.26
FoodNet’s objectives are to “accurately estimate the burden of foodborne disease in the United States,
investigate the sources of infection in outbreaks and sporadic cases, and build public health infrastructure
for dealing with emerging foodborne disease issues.”27
FoodNet is unique because it engages in active, as opposed to passive, surveillance of foodborne illnesses.28
Instead of waiting for laboratories to report ﬁndings of diﬀerent foodborne illnesses to health departments,
23Id.
24Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, FoodNet, What is FoodNet?, supra note 15.
25Id.
26News and Notes, The National Food Safety Initiative, 4 Emerging Infectious Diseases 347, 348 (April-June 1998)
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol4no2/adobe/new.pdf (last visited March 7, 2003).
27Bala Swaminathan, Timothy J. Barrett, Susan B. Hunter, Robert V. Tauxe and the CDC PulseNet Task Force, Synopses:
PulseNet: The Molecular Subtyping Network for Foodborne Bacterial Disease Surveillance, United States, 7 Emerging In-
fectious Diseases 382 (May-June 2001), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no3/pdfs/swaminathan.pdf (last
visited March 7, 2003).
28Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, FoodNet, What is FoodNet?, supra note 15.
5under FoodNet, public health oﬃcials are constantly in contact with the labs in order to learn about new
outbreaks of foodborne diseases and the information from those labs is reported to the CDC.29 In addition to
the information obtained from the laboratories, FoodNet also includes “case control” studies performed by
the CDC as part of FoodNet.30 These “case control” studies are a clearer display of the role that the CDC
plays in surveillance of FDA-regulated products speciﬁcally, and not just the spread of pathogens from those
products to victims. Under some of the “case control” studies, the CDC actually “examine[s] the association
between infections and speciﬁc foods.”31 It is at this point that the surveillance activities that the CDC
undertakes are most similar to those undertaken by the FDA when it performs post-market surveillance on
products.32
By conducting surveillance of FDA-regulated products through FoodNet, the CDC’s eﬀorts diﬀer from those
of the FDA or the U.S. Customs Service, in the case of imports. Through FoodNet, the introduction of
foodborne pathogens through food products is usually only detected once the pathogens are found in stool
samples, that clinical laboratories then analyze, and then report their ﬁndings back to CDC.33 Thus, al-
though FoodNet conducts active surveillance of the foodborne illnesses themselves, it is conducting, in a
sense, an indirect form of surveillance of the food products that cause those illnesses. FoodNet uses a variety
of sources of information in compiling its data. Although FoodNet largely relies on the information from the
laboratories to detect foodborne illness, its monitoring activities also include the aforementioned CDC case
studies and laboratory and physicians surveys conducted by FoodNet in an attempt to collect information
about the process of how both laboratories and physicians treat and evaluate foodborne diseases.34
From its beginning, FoodNet helped provide immediate dividends to the public health. It identiﬁed Campy-
29Id.
30General Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 18, at 9.
31Id. at 9.
32Id. at 8.
33Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, FoodNet, What is FoodNet?, supra note 15.
34General Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 18, at 45.
6lobacter as the “most common cause of foodborne disease” and assisted investigations into Listerosis found
in hot dogs and Salmonella found in toasted oat cereal.35 By 2000, the increased surveillance by FoodNet
had helped contribute to a “25 percent decline between 1998 and 1999 in the number of E. coli O157:H7
infections; a 41 percent drop in the incidence of Shigella infections; and a 19 percent decline in the number
of illnesses caused by Campylobacter.”36
FoodNet does suﬀer from gaps in its surveillance system. One of the largest gaps is that the system only
incorporates information from patients who have gone to see a doctor, and from whom samples have been
sent to laboratories.37 If, as with many cases of foodborne illness, the patient never goes to see a doctor,
then FoodNet has no way of knowing about their illness.38 A General Accounting Oﬃce report cited a
CDC-sponsored study that showed that in only 7% of 340 million cases of people who suﬀer from acute
diarrheal illness each year do people seek treatment.39 Thus, although FoodNet does mark a shift away from
‘passive’ surveillance of foodborne illness, these systems of surveillance will always incorporate some aspect
of passivity. Monitoring of foodborne illnesses will always be reliant on victims taking some steps to receive
medical attention for their illness.
Some might argue that this is not a crucial factor, with regards to the notion that if a victim does not
seek medical attention, then obviously the illness from which they suﬀer is not that severe and perhaps
not a priority for surveillance. Therefore, FoodNet would be more eﬀective and eﬃcient in spending its
resources monitoring those illnesses for which medical attention has been sought. One small problem with
35Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Fact Sheet, HHS Initiatives To Reduce Foodborne Illness, March 16,
2000, at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼lrd/hhsfsi2.html (last visited March 7, 2003); News and Notes, The National Food Safety
Initiative, supra note 26.
36Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 35.
37Foodborne Illness In United States On A Decline, Food & Drink Weekly, Apr. 29, 2002, available at 2002 WL 9681141.
38Id.
39General Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 18, at 7.
7this approach is that the decision not to seek medical attention is not always directly linked to the severity
of the illness, although that likely is the scenario in a majority of cases. Gaps of this type may exist within
FoodNet’s surveillance of cases of even severe diseases.
Another gap in the FoodNet surveillance system takes place at the point where victims of foodborne illness
seek medical attention. The fact that foodborne illnesses sometimes may not be correctly diagnosed, means
that even if a victim of foodborne illness seeks medical attention, if a doctor does not correctly diagnose
the illness, samples from that patient may never make their way into the FoodNet system.40 So, the cases
of foodborne illness that the CDC is able to trace through FoodNet are a subset of all cases of foodborne
illness.41 They are those cases in which the victim has sought medical attention, the physician or their
corresponding public health laboratory have correctly diagnosed the illness and that information has been
sent along by one of the nine EIP state sites working in conjunction with FoodNet.42 Although these factors
do limit the range of FoodNet, the system still tracks a sizable number of cases of foodborne illness.
The FoodNet system was cited in a Government Accounting Oﬃce report for failing to report information
from the “case control” studies it has performed, even though it does publish other information annually.43
The reporting of information is, of course, crucial to the success of a system that has as one of its major
goals the sharing of information.
B. PulseNet
40Foodborne Illness In United States On A Decline, supra note 37.
41Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Incidence of Foodborne Illnesses: Preliminary Data from the Foodborne Disease
Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) United States, 1998, CDC Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report, Mar. 12,
1999, 189, 193, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm4809.pdf (last visited March 7, 2003).
42Foodborne Illness In United States On A Decline, supra note 37.
43General Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 15, at 13-14.
8Another major surveillance system put together by the CDC is PulseNet. PulseNet is a nationwide network of
public health laboratories that uses bacterial subtyping or “DNA ﬁngerprinting” to help identify outbreaks of
foodborne illness.44 How does the scientiﬁc process of DNA ﬁngerprinting work? The ﬁngerprinting process
is another name for bacterial subtyping. In this process, the laboratories look at bacterial isolates, and
then try to determine if the isolates have a “very recent ...common ancestor.”45 This is possible because
when the bacteria reproduce, the new bacteria are virtually identical to their ancestors.46 These similarities
allow the laboratories to see a number of similarities between bacterial isolates from multiple subjects and
link them to a common ancestor.47 The samples taken by PulseNet are not simply bacterial isolates from
individual patients, but also bacterial isolates from contaminated food products, another way in which the
CDC conducts not just indirect, but direct surveillance of FDA-regulated products.48
Nationwide surveillance programs such as PulseNet, are most helpful in identifying “outbreaks of rare food-
borne diseases that occur over a wide geographic and temporal range and are consequently diﬃcult to detect
by classical epidemiologic approaches and surveillance systems.”49 Martin Wiedmann notes in his article
“Methods In Nutrition Science – Subtyping Of Bacterial Foodborne Pathogens”, the example of a type of lis-
teriosis that is both rare and which has a substantial incubation period.50 Wiedmann predicts that whereas
pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis (PFGE) subtyping is now a highly used approach to bacterial subtyping and
is the process used by PulseNet, DNA sequencing-based subtyping is the wave of the future.51 This is so
because using a DNA sequencing-based approach creates “sequence data [that is]... considerably less am-
44Wiedmann, supra note 7; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, What is PulseNet?, at
http://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/what is.htm (last visited March 7, 2003).
45Wiedmann, supra note 7.
46Id.
47Id.
48General Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 18, at 10.
49Wiedmann, supra note 7.
50Id.
51Id.
9biguous and easier to interpret than banding pattern-based subtypes obtained through the other DNA-based
subtyping approaches....”52 PulseNet is working to incorporate DNA sequencing-based subtyping into its
system and make the information obtained by that method compatible with current data.53
The Pulse Net laboratories can do a DNA ﬁngerprint of E. coli bacteria, a process that used to take much
longer.54 The beneﬁts of this faster detection are clear. State and local public health agencies can match
the E. coli bacteria with that from other patients, discovering the possibility of a common source between
two or more patients, and using information obtained from those patients, track down the source. The
increased speed in detection is quite important because the faster the source of the bacteria is detected, the
faster it can be removed from the market. Earlier warnings to the media can reduce the amount of human
consumption of the product. Whereas an outbreak may have had days or weeks to continue to infect the
populace without public knowledge in the past, under the new system, local health agencies can alert the
public and other public health agencies in a shorter period of time. The number of lives saved, illnesses
prevented, and dollars saved for the economy may be quite sizable. A request by a number of state and local
public health laboratories in a General Accounting Oﬃce report on CDC’s surveillance systems was direct
access to the PulseNet system, which would further speed up the detection process, and which has already
been given to some of the laboratories.55 These are only some of the beneﬁts of improved CDC surveillance
of foodborne illness and FDA-regulated products.
One example of the beneﬁcial use of PulseNet was the detection of a Shigella outbreak in 1998.56 Min-
nesota’s public health laboratory, one of the labs in the PulseNet system, was monitoring two Shigella
52Id (citations omitted).
53Bala Swaminathan, Timothy J. Barrett, Susan B. Hunter, Robert V. Tauxe and the CDC PulseNet Task Force, supra note
27, at 388.
54Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Oﬃce of Communication, CDC Data Provides The Most Complete Estimate
On Foodborne Disease in the United States CDC, supra note 2.
55General Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 18, at 14; Bala Swaminathan, Timothy J. Barrett, Susan B. Hunter, Robert V.
Tauxe and the CDC PulseNet Task Force, supra note 27, at 384.
56Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 35.
10outbreaks linked to restaurants.57 Using PulseNet, the Los Angeles public health laboratory was able to
quickly contact the Minnesota lab and let them know that they too were investigating Shigella outbreaks
linked with restaurants.58 The two labs, with the assistance of the CDC were able to use DNA ﬁngerprinting
of the bacteria to discover that the outbreaks were linked and the parties then traced the bacteria to parsley
that was used as a garnish in the restaurants.59 Eventually, the parsley was traced back to its source, a farm
in Mexico that agencies then advised on how to prevent further contamination of their crop.60 Once sources
like the one in Mexico are discovered, many actions may be taken, including a product recall.61
This example helps illustrate the process of working backwards to discover the source of foodborne illness
and then take action to prevent further contamination at the source. The focus of this paper however is
on the initial surveillance activities that alert agencies to a problem. The links between the Minnesota and
Los Angeles laboratories display the importance of national surveillance networks. Absent PulseNet, weeks
and months may have passed before the diﬀerent public health labs were aware that each was dealing with
Shigella outbreaks, if indeed they ever became aware of it. By linking the two and discovering through the
DNA ﬁngerprinting that the two outbreaks were linked, the public health laboratories could then narrow
down the number of possible sources to those products that were common amongst the restaurants to which
the outbreaks were linked.62 In this case, it turned out to be the parsley used as a garnish. Without the
ability to narrow down the list of possible sources with the information from other public health agencies,
the investigation may have taken far longer to identify the parsley as the culprit.
Much like FoodNet, PulseNet’s nationwide coverage enables it to detect widespread outbreaks through the
United States. In helping to identify a multi-state outbreak of Salmonella in toasted oat cereal, PulseNet
57Id.
58Id.
59Id.
60Id.
61General Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 18, at 52.
62Bala Swaminathan, Timothy J. Barrett, Susan B. Hunter, Robert V. Tauxe and the CDC PulseNet Task Force, supra note
27, at 386.
11managed to help identify the presence of the bacteria in 20 diﬀerent states.63Although this does indicate
that the bacteria had managed to spread over a wide region due to the distribution of the source, PulseNet
enabled public health oﬃcials to discover that the multiple outbreaks were linked.64
PulseNet has not gone without criticism and there is apparently still plenty of room for improvement with
CDC’s system. PulseNet only uses one pathogen ﬁngerprinting system, and while that system is the “most
broadly applicable method... [other] labs use about a dozen other methods to test for diﬀerent organisms.”65
Other criticisms of PulseNet include the fact that CDC has very rigid standards for all laboratories that
wish to be a part of the system, limiting its expansion, and the fact that it takes the CDC “a minimum of
24 hours to respond” to the labs.66 How much this time delay could be reduced remains to be seen. Time
delays for a surveillance system such as PulseNet are critical, as it is geared towards rapid dissemination of
information, and further delays might allow for “secondary or tertiary transmission” of illness.67 The CDC
realizes that PulseNet is not a perfect system, and has made use of the assistance of other ﬁngerprinting
systems in conducting surveillance of foodborne illness. One of those is a “Web-based library” of ﬁnger-
prints called PathogenTracker, created by Cornell University faculty and students.68 That website assisted
PulseNet and the CDC in 1998 in helping to track down a deadly Listeria outbreak.69
63U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Statement of Bernard A. Schwetz D.V.M., Ph.D., Acting Principal Deputy Commis-
sioner, Food and Drug Administration, Before the Committee on Governmental Aﬀairs, Subcommittee on Government Man-
agement, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, October 10, 2001 at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2001/foodsafety1010.html
(last visited March 7, 2003).
64Id.
65David Cameron, Food-Borne Bug Hunter, Technology Review, February 1, 2002, at
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/cameron020102.asp (last visited March 7, 2003).
66Id.
67Douglas N. Klaucke, James W. Buehler, Stephen B. Thacker, R. Gibson Parrish, Frederick L. Trowbridge, Ruth L. Berkel-
man, and the Surveillance Coordination Group, Guidelines for Evaluating Surveillance Systems, CDC Morbidity and Mor-
tality Weekly Report, May 6, 1988, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00001769.htm (last visited
March 7, 2003).
68Cameron, supra note 65.
69Id.
12C. Bioterrorism
The recent increase in possible concerns about bioterrorism bring about added importance to the role of
the CDC’s surveillance systems. The growing threat of terrorist attacks on domestic targets has led to
the Bush Administration’s increased concerns about the safety of the American food supply.70 The Bush
Administration requested 104 million dollars for the FDA as part of a 20 billion dollar emergency relief
budget request.71 Of that 104 million dollars, 61 million was to be used to increase inspections of food
imports.72 While part of the money was designated to allow FDA to hire more inspectors and agents to
help monitor imports, part of the money was also designated to improving the surveillance activities of the
FDA and CDC.73 Part of the money was to be used to expand FDA information systems, including the
eLEXNET system, which would work with PulseNet to better enable the “comparison of bacteria isolated
from patients from widespread locations, from foods and from food production facilities.”74
The case presented earlier of contaminated parsley from Mexico helps show concern about the potential for
contaminated imports from abroad. Bacteria in imported food could potentially pose a terrorist threat to
the United States if terrorists intentionally contaminate that food. CDC surveillance of the food supply
helps put the nation on alert of any emerging outbreaks and could help quickly reduce the impact of any
potential attack on the American public through the food supply. It would be incorrect to conﬁne the notion
of such a threat solely to imports. This threat of bioterrorism exists with regards to products that might be
purposefully contaminated here in the United States.
The CDC’s food surveillance success can be seen in the government’s willingness to see the system expand
70U.S. Food and Drug Administration, DHHS Requests Over $104 Million for FDA to Combat Bioterrorism, October 31,
2001 at http://www.fda.gov/oc/bioterrorism/budget.html (last visited March 7, 2003).
71Id.
72Id.
73Id.
74Id.
13even further, potentially to help combat bioterrorism. As part of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Congress granted 19.5 million dollars to states and Indian tribes
to enable them to create facilities that could conduct food surveillance and presumably to be part of both
FoodNet and PulseNet, among other systems.75 The value of the surveillance systems is demonstrated by
the fact that members of Congress saw ﬁt to include the expansion of the surveillance systems as part of a
bioterrorism bill. This is a tacit recognition that the dangers that FoodNet and PulseNet alert public health
oﬃcials to may not just be incidents of accidental contamination of the food supply, but rather purposeful
contamination of the food supply. The ﬁrst indications that the United States has fallen victim to such
an attack may result from the ﬁndings of public health agencies in conjunction with the CDC using the
PulseNet system to identify outbreaks that may occur on a nationwide scale. In a sense, the surveillance
data will help bring about investigations of common sources that not only involve the FDA and USDA, but
also have national security implications that will involve a number of other government agencies, including
the intelligence community and the military. It is not clear if concerns about bioterrorism may lead the CDC
to increase the number of diﬀerent types of bacteria that are currently tracked by the surveillance systems,
perhaps to make some type of adjustments to consider those types of bacteria that might likely be used in
such an attack. Congress, of course, included several other measures in the recent bioterrorism bill for FDA
and other agencies to undertake in preventing contaminated food from ever making it to the market, but
the CDC’s surveillance systems will keep watch in the possible event that these measures are ineﬀective in
guarding the American public against all such contaminated foods.76
75Breaking Down the Bioterrorism Bill, Food Chemical News, May 27, 2002, available at 2002 WL 11879342; Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, §317R (2002).
76Breaking Down the Bioterrorism Bill, supra note 75; Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, (2002).
14D. Imports and International Expansion of Surveillance
Beyond the concerns of bioterrorism, imported foods also pose a threat by the simple fact that many foreign
food producers might not undertake the same protections against contamination that American food pro-
ducers do. Furthermore, imported goods might introduce parasites and bacteria that have evolved outside
the United States and which are unfamiliar to the American diet, and perhaps in some cases, the American
medical profession. Although many of the steps to deal with these contaminated imports lead beyond the
surveillance activities of the CDC, surveillance will likely be the ﬁrst indication that these foreign contami-
nants are causing foodborne illness in the United States. This detection of illness by the surveillance systems
will help bring about the procedures needed to prevent further consumption of the imports and eliminate
contamination of the imports at their source. As noted above with regards to bioterrorism, surveillance is
the ﬁrst line of defense in that it may be the ﬁrst to identify the pathogens causing outbreaks. Surveillance
is also, in another manner, the last line of defense in that it will identify these pathogens only after the con-
taminated products made it all the way through various customs procedures to ﬁnally reach the American
market.
The success of PulseNet in the United States has led the CDC to attempt to expand the network globally.77
The CDC is working on this project in conjunction with the World Health Organization.78 PulseNet also
has a European counterpart called EuroNet.79 The two systems have been sharing information since 2001.80
This global increase in communication about outbreaks of foodborne illness is particularly valuable when
77U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Statement of Bernard A. Schwetz D.V.M., Ph.D., Acting Principal Deputy Com-
missioner, Food and Drug Administration, Before the Committee on Governmental Aﬀairs, Subcommittee on Government
Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, supra note 63.
78Id.
79Patricia Simms, E. Coli Outbreak Prompts Beef Recall; Infection Has Sickened 52 People In Wisconsin, Wisconsin State
Journal, Sept. 28, 2002, available at 2002 WL 24286860.
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15considering the amount of imported food products consumed by the American public. It also will perhaps
better enable public health agencies and the CDC to work with their European counterparts in identifying
foreign sources of bacteria and in working to stop contamination of the food supply abroad.
E. Other CDC Foodborne Disease Surveillance Systems
Surveillance of diseases is a major task for the CDC, and the CDC conducts, outside of FoodNet and
PulseNet, a wide variety of surveillance systems of foodborne illnesses. For example, under the CDC’s
Emerging Infections Program, are programs such as Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs) which mon-
itor various bacterial diseases.81 This mission may seem similar to FoodNet’s, but FoodNet is speciﬁcally
designated to more closely focus on foodborne and waterborne disease, particularly a limited number of
pathogens.82 The General Accounting Oﬃce in September of 2001 published a report, Food Safety: CDC Is
Working to Address Limitations in Several of Its Foodborne Disease Surveillance Systems, that outlined the
surveillance systems that the CDC conducted, and also discussed some of the problems and issues with those
surveillance systems.83 Two major surveillance systems the report discussed are the Foodborne Disease Out-
break Surveillance System and the Surveillance Outbreak Detection Algorithim.84 The Foodborne Disease
Outbreak Surveillance System, a passive surveillance system, performs the function that its name indicates,
it conducts surveillance of foodborne disease outbreaks across the country.85 The types of sources to which
it has helped trace outbreaks are a wide variety of FDA-regulated food products. The list of vehicles for
81Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, NCID: Surveillance Resources: Emerging Infections Program, at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/osr/EIP.htm (last visited March 7, 2003).
82Id.
83General Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 18, at 2.
84Id. at 3.
85Id. at 3.
16“outbreaks due to bacterial etiologies” includes a wide variety of FDA-regulated products including rice,
salmon, salad, refried beans and macaroni and cheese.86 There is a wide variety of prepared foods listed,
identifying the fact that a great deal of contamination of these FDA-regulated products takes place during
the preparation of the foods.87 Even a product which meets the FDA’s strict regulations and requirements
may become contaminated through its use, and it falls upon various public health organizations, with the
assistance of the CDC to use surveillance to monitor the eﬀects that these now-contaminated products have
on the American public. One success of the Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System that is noted
in the GAO’s report is that its data helped show “the importance of shell eggs as a source of human infection
with Salmonella Enteritidis”, a revelation that helped lead to changes in the ways in which the shell eggs
were produced and transported and which brought about new FDA regulations for the retail sale of the
eggs.88 This is another prime example of the process in which information from CDC surveillance systems
can help bring about new regulations. The Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System does suﬀer
from some limitations, such as the fact that not all outbreaks are monitored under the system.89 Another
complaint about the Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System is that it is too slow in releasing data
to be very eﬀective.90 Speed of response is particularly important in responding to outbreaks of disease
in order to more quickly ﬁnd the source of the outbreak and prevent further spread of the pathogen. The
delays in the reporting of data from the Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System are signiﬁcant.
The General Accounting Oﬃce report cited a lag of 3 years for the reporting of information that the system
86Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Foodborne Outbreak Response and Surveillance Unit, Outbreaks: 2000
Foodborne Diseases Outbreaks Due to Bacterial Etologies, Foodborne Outbreak Response and Surveillance Unit, at
http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/us outb/fbo2000/bacterial00.htm (last visited March 7, 2003).
87Id.
88General Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 18, at 8-9.
89For example, outbreaks stemming from food eaten outside the United States or from drinking water are not included.
Sonja J. Olsen, Linda C. MacKinnon, Joy S. Goulding, Nancy H. Bean & Laurence Slutsker, Surveillance for Foodborne
Disease Outbreaks – United States – 1993-1997, CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, March 17, 2000, 3,
available at ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/mmwr/ss/ss4901.pdf (last visited March 7, 2003).
90General Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 18, at 3.
17gathered for 1997.91 It is easy to see that this data may be useful for long-term epidemiological studies, but
when confronted with a rapidly spreading outbreak or some similar type of public health crisis, data from
the system will only really be helpful in the aftermath of such a crisis.92
The CDC also has a variety of other surveillance systems that monitor foodborne diseases and FDA-regulated
products as part of their overall responsibilities.93 These include the Botulism Surveillance System which
speciﬁcally monitors botulism, but which does not restrict those activities to simply foodborne cases of
botulism.94 Given the potential for the use of botulism as a potential agent in bioterrorism, outside of a
foodborne source, the system may shift a little of its focus away from foodborne cases. Six diﬀerent surveil-
lance systems, including FoodNet and PulseNet, but also including electronic reporting systems such as the
Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS) and the National Electronic Telecommunications
System for Surveillance (NETSS) monitor Escherichia coli O157:H7.95 The same six surveillance systems,
also monitor Salmonella.96 For instance, there is the National Salmonella Surveillance System, which reports
information on Salmonella through the electronic reporting system, Public Health Laboratory Information
System (PHLIS), one of the six surveillance systems, which is also run by the CDC.97 Information from the
National Salmonella Surveillance System provided the basis for the Salmonella Outbreak Detection Algo-
rithm (SODA) and the Surveillance Outbreak Detection Algorithm.98
91Id. at 13.
92Id. at 13.
93Id. at 11.
94Id. at 11.
95Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, Escherichia coli O157:H7 – Ad-
ditional Information: Surveillance, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/escherichiacoli a.htm (last visited March
7, 2003).
96Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, Salmonellosis – Additional Infor-
mation: Surveillance, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/salmonellosis a.htm (last visited March 7, 2003).
97Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control Prevention, National Cen-
ter for Infectious Diseases, Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, Foodborne and Diarrheal
Diseases Branch, National Salmonella Surveillance System, Annual Summary, 2001, I, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/phlisdata/salmtab/2001/SalmonellaAnnualSummary2001.pdf (last visited March 7,
2003).
98Id. at II; Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control Prevention, Na-
tional Center for Infectious Diseases, Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, Foodborne and Diar-
rheal Diseases Branch, National Salmonella Surveillance System, Annual Summary, 2000, II, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/phlisdata/salmtab/2000/SalmonellaAnnualSummary2000.PDF (last visited March 7,
18The Surveillance Outbreak Detection Algorithm monitors two speciﬁc pathogens, Salmonella and Shigella,
and conducts surveillance to “detect unusual increases in [their]... incidence” to determine if there has been
an outbreak of either of the pathogens.99 The Surveillance Outbreak Detection Algorithm is unique in that
it uses statistical data in its surveillance of Salmonella and Shigella.100 This system spotlights the beneﬁt
of having the CDC conduct surveillance on a nationwide scale in conjunction with state and local agencies.
Its ability to compile together data from a variety of diﬀerent sources enables it to collect a wider ﬁeld of
data, which when compared with the statistical data, enables it to uncover an outbreak where a state or
local agency with fewer resources and less data might not.101
III. Surveillance of Antibiotic Resistance
Another major surveillance system that monitors aspects of both foodborne illness and antimicrobial drugs
is the National Antibiotic Resistance Monitoring System – Enteric Bacteria (NARMS) that is run jointly by
the CDC, FDA, and USDA.102 NARMS was originally established in 1996, the same year as FoodNet, and
it focused upon Salmonella.103 NARMS conducts surveillance from a diﬀerent approach than PulseNet or
FoodNet. NARMS “monitors when foodborne bacteria that can cause disease in humans begin to develop
resistance to antimicrobials used in food animals.”104 The resistance issue is a critical one due to the possible
eﬀect of strengthening resistance of the bacteria to antimicrobials. Increased use of antimicrobials in the food
2003).
99General Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 18, at 3.
100Id. at 10.
101Id. at 10.
102U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Veterinary Medicine, National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System:
Enteric Bacteria, August 2002, at http://www.fda.gov/cvm/index/narms/narmsbro.htm (last visited March 7, 2003).
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104U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Food Safety Progress Report, Fiscal Year 2000, August 2001 at
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼dms/fsirp004.html (last visited March 7, 2003).
19supply will potentially lead to more diﬃculty in treating human illnesses with antimicrobials as those illnesses
are caused by increasingly drug-resistant strains of bacteria.105 Surveillance of FDA regulated products in
this manner does not attempt necessarily to trace a foodborne illness back to its source, but rather give
those in public health organizations a better view of the big picture with regards to bacterial resistance
to antimicrobials and the food industry’s place in that process. The work that NARMS does involves a
variety of FDA-regulated products. Not only does NARMS work involve various types of food animals, from
whom samples are taken to determine antimicrobial resistance, but NARMS’ work also involves a variety of
antimicrobial drugs.106 There is a division of labor within NARMS, samples from human beings are sent
by public health agencies to a CDC laboratory and samples taken from food animals are sent to a USDA
laboratory.107
IV. Surveillance of Vaccines
Food safety is not the only area in which the CDC conducts surveillance of FDA-regulated products. CDC
also conducts surveillance of various drugs, particularly vaccines.
One current example of the CDC’s surveillance of vaccines is the CDC’s surveillance of the current vaccination
of government workers with the smallpox vaccine.108 CDC surveillance monitored the ﬁrst two “moderate-
to-severe events” tied to the vaccination program, one moderate-to severe event and one serious adverse
105U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Food Safety Progress Report, Fiscal Year 2000, supra note 104; U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, Center for Veterinary Medicine, National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System: Enteric Bacteria, supra
note 102.
106U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Veterinary Medicine, National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System:
Enteric Bacteria, supra note 102.
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108Amanda Gardner, First Moderate Reaction to Smallpox Jab Reported, Drug Digest, Feb. 27, 2003 at
http://www.drugdigest.org/DD/Articles/News/0,10141,511996,00.html (last visited March 7, 2003).
20event.109 The surveillance program has already been criticized because all of the severe cases reported have
only been found in one state, Florida.110 The CDC plans to institute a wide ranging telephone survey of
10,000 recipients of the smallpox vaccine to help learn what nonserious side eﬀects there have been, while
“clinicians [will] report directly to the CDC” any severe side eﬀects.111 The survey will be conducted on
days 10 and 21 after the individuals have received the vaccine.112
A. Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS)
The CDC and FDA jointly sponsor a Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) which performs
surveillance on a nationwide scale of various vaccines. 113 VAERS is used as part of the approval process
for vaccines and is used to help “identify problems after marketing begins.”114 VAERS was established in
1990 as a result of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.115 The VAERS system also displays
another instance of the CDC working in tandem with regulatory agencies. Data reported to VAERS may
indicate that there is a “safety risk” with a vaccine, and the CDC may use that data to “detect unusual
epidemiological trends and associations” that show a “safety risk”, but only FDA has the power to actually
109Id.; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Smallpox Vaccine Adverse Events Among Civilians – United States,
February 18-24, 2003, CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Feb. 28, 2003, 156, 157, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5208.pdf (last visited March 7, 2003).
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February 7, 2003, 88, 89, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5205.pdf (last visited March 7, 2003).
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System for the First Stage of the Smallpox Vaccination Program, supra note 111, at 89.
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21recall a vaccine in response to the “safety risk”.116 Once again, CDC’s surveillance role has an impact on
the regulations that are created once the CDC has helped display that a problem exists.
VAERS not only serves a function in helping inform regulatory agencies of the adverse eﬀects of vaccines, but
it also serves a public information function. VAERS operates a website that allows members of the public,
along with public health organizations and vaccine manufacturers, to see the data on the adverse eﬀects of
vaccines that the system contains.117 This information function is particularly important because members
of the public often have questions regarding the safety of the various vaccines that their physicians suggest
receiving. Another area in which this public information function is likely to become more important in the
future is with regards to highly debated vaccinations against diseases like smallpox, which could be used in
terrorist attacks. Both the smallpox and anthrax vaccine have met with a great degree of opposition from a
number of parties and information such as that on the VAERS website would give individuals a clearer look
at what adverse eﬀects have been reported from the vaccines.
VAERS, unlike FoodNet, is a “passive surveillance system” and as a result, suﬀers from potential gaps in and
problems with its data.118 Reports to VAERS are “unveriﬁed reports of adverse events temporally associated
with one or more vaccines.”119 Potential problems with VAERS data include “limitations of under-reporting,
simultaneous administration of multiple vaccine antigens, reporting bias, and lack of incidence rates in
unvaccinated comparison groups.”120 Only a small fraction of reports are made to VAERS in comparison
116Id.
117Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, VAERS – The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, at
http://www.vaers.org (last visited March 7, 2003). See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Surveillance
for Safety After Immunization: Vaccine Adverse Even Reporting System (VAERS) – United States, 1991- 2001, at
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22with the total number of doses of vaccines administered each year.121 Also important is that “no cause and
eﬀect relationship has been established” for VAERS reports.122 However, investigators take the data from
VAERS and attempt to determine in which reports of adverse events there was a causal relationship with
the vaccine.123
All of these issues do at least cast doubt on the VAERS system, and potentially create a problem with
the public information function of VAERS. Based on these problems, VAERS data does not necessarily
show illnesses and side eﬀects that the vaccines caused, so much as simply showing what the health of the
individuals was within a short time period after taking the vaccine. Many members of the public who look
at the website’s data concerning the safety of vaccines could potentially equate all negative events to the
vaccine, where, in fact, the vaccine may not have caused those eﬀects, and the data will cause unnecessary
and unwarranted alarm about the vaccine’s safety. While it is certainly best in these circumstances to err
on the side of safety and make the public aware of all adverse events that patients suﬀer after receiving
a vaccine, it should be acknowledged that potentially beneﬁcial vaccines do run the risk of having their
reputation in the eyes of the public tainted by negative unrelated data.
Although VAERS is a passive surveillance system, the CDC will, in some instances, conduct limited active
surveillance following the administration of a vaccine.124 With regards to the administration of the smallpox
121Out of approximately 1.9 billion doses of vaccines given from 1991-2001, VAERS received 128,717 reports. Vaccine Safety:
U.S. Adverse Events Compiled For Decade, Vaccine Weekly, Feb. 12, 2003, at 38.
122U.S. Food and Drug Administration, CBER – Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) Information, supra note
118.
123Out of 602 adverse reports from administration of an anthrax vaccine, investigators narrowed down the information to show
six serious adverse events causally related to the vaccine. Maria G. Essig, Anthrax: Serious Adverse Eﬀects From Anthrax
Vaccine Low, Vaccine Weekly, July 31, 2002, at 4.
124Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines (Version 3.0), Annex 4, Vaccine
Adverse-Event Reporting, Annex 4-4, (2002), at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/ﬁles/annex-4.pdf (last
visited March 7, 2003).
23vaccine, a “diary report card” will be given to recipients so that they can notify CDC of any reactions
following the administration of the vaccine.125 This diﬀers from passive surveillance because the reports of
the recipients are being “actively solicited”.126
V. Reliance of Surveillance Systems on State and Local Public Health Departments
The CDC’s surveillance eﬀorts are largely reliant on the activities of state and local public health depart-
ments.127 Without these agencies reporting cases of illness to the CDC’s systems like FoodNet and PulseNet,
those systems would be ineﬀective. Regardless of whether the surveillance system is active or passive, the
eﬀorts of the CDC in surveillance will still greatly rely on state and local public health departments.128 The
CDC’s reliance on data from state public health departments stems in part from the fact that the “states
have principal responsibility for protecting the public’s health”.129 As a result, it is state agencies that
will be ﬁrst notiﬁed with the data and reports of foodborne diseases, state agencies that will have the ﬁrst
opportunity to analyze that data, and it will fall upon those state agencies to then pass that information
along to the CDC so that they may make use of the data and help coordinate the sharing of that information,
through the networks, with other state and local health departments.130 One small potential exception is
the VAERS system, to which anyone may report adverse eﬀects following a vaccination, but this is only a
small exception because the overwhelming number of reports to the system are made by physicians and state
and local public health departments.
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127General Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 18, at 2.
128Id. at 1.
129Id. at 5.
130Id. at 5.
24Another central issue regarding reliance on state public health departments is that state public health depart-
ments are often are often limited by what duties their state legislatures have authorized them to perform.131
The legislatures are unable to keep pace with recent scientiﬁc developments, and the public health depart-
ments are left to fall behind as well.132
Complaints have been cited not just with the CDC’s delays in reporting data, but the delays of the state and
local agencies in reporting data to the CDC.133 As noted above, the CDC’s surveillance activities are largely
dependent on the actions of the state and local public health departments. If state and local agencies do not
report data, then even in an active surveillance system like FoodNet, all the CDC can do is call the state
agencies and ask for information. These failures in reporting can lead to signiﬁcant gaps in the information
that the network collects. Surveillance systems such as PulseNet and FoodNet are important in part because
they allow the various state and local agencies to see information compiled from their counterparts in other
jurisdictions. Systems such as FoodNet will not be successful if state and local agencies are unwilling or un-
able to perform their reporting functions and actively participate. Furthermore, even when states do report,
those reports may be incomplete, failing to list an identiﬁed pathogen or contaminated food source.134
Another diﬃculty for CDC in creating nationwide networks such as FoodNet and PulseNet is that state and
local agencies do not have uniform procedures in reporting their data.135 For example, diﬀerent states report
diﬀerent diseases.136 Uniformity is required for the PulseNet system which needs all laboratories to follow
131David P. Fidler, Perspectives: Legal Issues Associated With Antimicrobial Drug Resistance, 4 Emerging Infectious
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7, 2003).
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25the same protocol in order to compare bacterial isolates.137 There is an inherent diﬃculty in trying to take
various pieces of information from diﬀerent sources and try to compile it in a standard nationwide network.
VI. Conclusion
The CDC’s surveillance systems, particularly systems such as FoodNet and PulseNet, are invaluable in
coordinating and analyzing information from state and local public health departments across the United
States. Taking into account the complaints aired with the current operation of the surveillance systems, there
is still certainly room for improvement. These improvements will be needed because although incidents of
foodborne illnesses have been decreasing, they still take far too great a toll in lives lost each year, and
on the national economy as well. The growing threat of bioterrorism also makes these systems, as well
as surveillance systems for vaccines, such as VAERS, and current work surrounding the smallpox vaccine,
even more important. The increase in funding provided in the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 as well as the continuing eﬀorts of the CDC and state and local
health agencies to improve surveillance all provide hope for the future improved operation of these systems.
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